Game theoretic sensor management for target tracking

Dan Shen; Genshe Chen; Erik Blasch; Khanh Pham; Philip Douville; Chun Yang; Ivan Kadar

doi:10.1117/12.850870

27 April 2010 Game theoretic sensor management for target tracking

Dan Shen, Genshe Chen, Erik Blasch, Khanh Pham, Philip Douville, Chun Yang, Ivan Kadar

Proceedings Volume 7697, Signal Processing, Sensor Fusion, and Target Recognition XIX; 76970C (2010) https://doi.org/10.1117/12.850870
Event: SPIE Defense, Security, and Sensing, 2010, Orlando, Florida, United States

Abstract

This paper develops and evaluates a game-theoretic approach to distributed sensor-network management for target tracking via sensor-based negotiation. We present a distributed sensor-based negotiation game model for sensor management for multi-sensor multi-target tacking situations. In our negotiation framework, each negotiation agent represents a sensor and each sensor maximizes their utility using a game approach. The greediness of each sensor is limited by the fact that the sensor-to-target assignment efficiency will decrease if too many sensor resources are assigned to a same target. It is similar to the market concept in real world, such as agreements between buyers and sellers in an auction market. Sensors are willing to switch targets so that they can obtain their highest utility and the most efficient way of applying their resources. Our sub-game perfect equilibrium-based negotiation strategies dynamically and distributedly assign sensors to targets. Numerical simulations are performed to demonstrate our sensor-based negotiation approach for distributed sensor management.

Citation Download Citation

Dan Shen, Genshe Chen, Erik Blasch, Khanh Pham, Philip Douville, Chun Yang, and Ivan Kadar "Game theoretic sensor management for target tracking", Proc. SPIE 7697, Signal Processing, Sensor Fusion, and Target Recognition XIX, 76970C (27 April 2010); https://doi.org/10.1117/12.850870

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