1 June 2011 Vulnerability to chosen-plaintext attack of optoelectronic information encryption with phase-shifting interferometry
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Abstract
The optical cryptosystem based on phase-shifting interferometry (PSI) is one of the most interesting optical cryptographic schemes in recent years. However, we find that the PSI technique provides an attractive method to record the ciphertext, but contributes little to the security level of the cryptosystem. From the cryptanalysis point of view, in a certain simplified case, an attacker is only required to crack two equivalent decryption keys instead of the original random phase keys and geometric key. Moreover, a chosen-plaintext attack method is proposed, in which an impulse function is chosen as a known plaintext. By using this attack, the attacker can effectively recover any plaintext from the corresponding ciphertext. The validity of the attack is verified by computer simulations.
©(2011) Society of Photo-Optical Instrumentation Engineers (SPIE)
Wan Qin, Xiang Peng, Xiangfeng Meng, and Bruce Z. Gao "Vulnerability to chosen-plaintext attack of optoelectronic information encryption with phase-shifting interferometry," Optical Engineering 50(6), 065601 (1 June 2011). https://doi.org/10.1117/1.3590725
Published: 1 June 2011
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CITATIONS
Cited by 16 scholarly publications.
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KEYWORDS
Phase interferometry

Optoelectronics

Cryptanalysis

Fourier transforms

Computer simulations

Optical engineering

Charge-coupled devices

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