KEYWORDS: Control systems, Multimedia, Telecommunications, Mobile communications, Systems modeling, Interference (communication), Video, Signal to noise ratio, Phase modulation, Transmitters
This paper investigates the power control mechanism in the context ofthird generation multimedia multirate wideband CDMA (WCDMA) mobile communications. We first present the system model and get the sufficient condition for the existence of feasible power assignment. Under this constraint, we reformulate the power control problem as a non-cooperative game in allocating the normalized QoS products, and propose a new call admission control (CAC) algorithm based on uniform-price auction (UPA) to control the power. Properties ofUPA's Nash equilibrium, especially its efficiency, are also discussed in wireless system environment. The results of comparison show that our scheme charging users on the QoS products has the enormous advantage over other pricing schemes charging users directly on the transmit powers. Numerical results which demonstrate the viability ofthe proposed algorithm are presented.
KEYWORDS: Control systems, Multimedia, Mobile communications, Systems modeling, Telecommunications, Interference (communication), Video, Signal to noise ratio, Transmitters, Electronics
This paper investigates the power control mechanism in the context of third generation multimedia multirate wideband CDMA (WCDMA) mobile communications. We first present the system model and get the sufficient condition for the existence of feasible power assignment. Under this constraint, we reformulate the power control problem as a non-cooperative game in allocating the normalized QoS products, and propose a new call admission control (CAC) algorithm based on uniform-price auction (UPA) to control the power. Properties of UPA Nash equilibrium, especially its efficiency, are also discussed in wireless system environment. The results of comparison show that our scheme charging users on the QoS products has the enormous advantage over other pricing schemes charging users directly on the transmit powers. Numerical results which demonstrate the viability of the proposed algorithm are presented.
It has been widely accepted that auctioning which is the pricing approach with minimal information requirement is a proper tool to manage scare network resources. Previous works focus on Vickrey auction which is incentive compatible in classic auction theory. In the beginning of this paper, the faults of the most representative auction-based mechanisms are discussed. And then a new method called uniform-price auction (UPA), which has the simplest auction rule is proposed and it's incentive compatibility in the network environment is also proved. Finally, the basic mode is extended to support applications which require minimum bandwidth guarantees for a given time period by introducing derivative market, and a market mechanism for network resource allocation which is predictable, riskless, and simple for end-users is completed.
This paper describes a QoS guarantee architecture suited for best-effort environments, based on ideas from microeconomics and non-cooperative game theory. First, an analytic model is developed for the study of the resource allocation in the Internet. Then we show that with a simple pricing mechanism (from network implementation and users' points-of-view), we were able to provide QoS guarantee at per flow level without resource allocation or complicated scheduling mechanisms or maintaining per flow state in the core network. Unlike the previous work on this area, we extend the basic model to support inelastic applications which require minimum bandwidth guarantees for a given time period by introducing derivative market.
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